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FAILURE TO MEET THEIR APPOINTED ROUNDS -
TORT LIABILITY OF POSTAL SERVICE
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL FOR LOST
OR MISHANDLED MAIL
INTRODUCTION
The problem of poor mail delivery service is a recurring
one, felt in all segments of society. For the small businessman,
who relies on the Postal Service as a lifeline to his customers,
suppliers, and creditors, late or misplaced mail delivery can
result in financial loss and damage to business reputation.'
Furthermore, the severity of this problem is heightened by the
fact that there is no commercial recourse available-the Postal
Service exerts monopolistic control over letter deliveries. If the
distraught businessman attempts to right this wrong in court,
he becomes sorely aware of the federal laws immunizing the
Postal Service from tort liability for lost or negligently handled
mail .2
Despite the pervasive immunity of the Service itself, a
postal employee who personally mishandles the mail is liable
for his negligence. However, this remains an illusory avenue to
relief. As a practical matter, finding the person who actually
mishandled the mail often provides an impervious barrier to
recovery. A more efficacious avenue to relief would fasten lia-
bility on the personnel who supervise the allegedly negligent
employees. Nevertheless, the law is silent as to the liability in
tort of postal employees at the supervisory level.
This comment attempts to expose this noticeable gap in
the tort law and supply a foundation for imposing liability on
supervisory employees. In the course of providing this founda-
tion, it details three legal hurdles which must be surmounted
in order to impose such liability-the Federal Tort Claims Act,
the Postal Reorganization Act, and the doctrine of discretion-
ary immunity.
After a brief look at early case law, the legislative and case
history of both the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Postal
1. Businessmen customarily rely on the mails to advertise upcoming sales. Delay
of sale advertisements to a number of customers results in depleted stock for the
involuntarily tardy shopper. The consequential loss of goodwill is substantial. In addi-
tion, a misplaced order for goods with a supplier results in the shopper not being able
to buy out of stock items. Again, the loss of goodwill is noticeable. A businessman's
credit rating is endangered by nondelivery of a creditor's bill. All of the preceding
situations raise havoc with a small businessman's operations.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1970). For the text of this statute see note 12 infra.
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Reorganization Act is examined to determine if it contemplates
supervisorial liability. Assuming these Acts can be interpreted
to establish liability, this comment then analyzes the impact
of the doctrine of discretionary immunity, as enunciated in
Barr v. Matteo,3 on situations when liability might conceivably
attach. Finally, this comment explores development of the case
law concerning supervisorial liability in analogous federal
agencies and projects its application to Postal Service supervi-
sors.
EARLY CASE LAW
There is a substantial body of older case law specifically
imposing liability upon postmasters for the nondelivery of
mail.' In his Treatise on Torts, Cooley described the liability
as follows:
But in respect to mail matter received at his
[postmaster's] office for delivery, a duty is fixed upon him
in behalf of the several persons to whom each letter, paper
or parcel is directed. When the proper person calls for what
is there for delivery, the postmaster must deliver it, and his
refusal to do so is a tort. The postmaster is also liable to
the person entitled to it for the loss, through his own care-
lessness or that of any of his clerks or servants, of any letter
or other mail matter which shall have come into his official
custody.5
In Dunlop v. Monroe, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the liability of a postmaster for negligent supervision
of his assistants. The Court was careful to limit those situations
in which the postmaster would be charged with the negligence
of his assistants.' Liability was found to exist only when the
negligent acts resulted from the postmater's failure to properly
supervise his assistants in the discharge of their duties.7 Subse-
quent cases reaffirmed this rule.'
3. 360 U.S. 564 (1958).
4. See 2 I. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 305, at 404 (4th ed. 1932).
5. Id. Cooley cites the following authorities in support of this proposition:
"Bishop v. Williamson, 11 Me. 495; Bolan v. Williamson, 1 Brev. (S.C.) 181, 2 Bay
551; Coleman & Lipscomb v. Frazier, 4 Rich. (S.C.) 146, 53 Am. Dec. 727; Christy v.
Smith, 23 Vt. 663; Ford v. Parker, 4 Ohio 576; Raisler v. Oliver, 97 Ala. 710, 12 So.
238, 38 Am. St. Rep. 213." Id.
6. 8 U.S. (7 Cranch) 242 (1812).
7. Id. at 269.
8. See, e.g., Raisler v. Oliver, 97 Ala. 710, 12 So. 238 (1893). In Raisler the court
held:
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This early case law seemed to establish a clear avenue of
relief for the disgruntled businessman injured by defective mail
delivery. However, this clear avenue was clouded somewhat by
the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Acts, specifically the
provisions which limited the Act's general waiver of sovereign
immunity.
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Legislative Background
Prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act, there was no general
waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions on the part of the
United States Government.' Since the federal government had
not consented to be sued for the tortious acts of its agents, the
individual claimant's only recourse was to seek relief through
private legislation.'0 Under this scheme, Congress considered
individually the claims of unhappy postal customers.
As the number of claims multiplied, Congress found itself
hard pressed to discharge its legislative functions." Witnesses
who appeared before a special committee of Congress, investi-
gating the ability of the legislative branch to cope with its
increasingly complex problems, testified with near unanimity
that congressional consideration of private claim bills was sim-
ply too time consuming." The implication of this testimony
was clear-the private claim bills were impediments to a more
efficient lawmaking body. The special committee subsequently
proposed a bill to streamline the workload of Congress. The bill
confronted the problems created by the escalating number of
[A] postmaster is not responsible for the defaults or misfeasance of
his clerks or assistants, although appointed by him and under his control,
unless it be shown that the postmaster was negligent in not exercising
proper care and prudence in the selection of suitable and competent
persons to perform the duties of clerks or deputy assistants, or unless it
be shown that the postmaster himself was negligent in the duty resting
upon him, to properly superintend such clerks or assistants in the per-
formance of the particular acts or duty, the doing of which, or the omis-
sion to do which, caused the loss and injury.
Id. at 713, 12 So. at 240 (emphasis added).
9. See 1 L. JAYSON, PERSONAL INJURY-HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CL.IMs § 51
(1977).
10. See Boarchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 1 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 1 (1933);
Boarchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort-A Proposed Statutory Reform, 11
A.B.A.J. 495 (1925); Boarchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924).
11. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 9, § 52, at 2-6.
12. See Hearings on S. 2177 Before the Joint Special Comm. on the Organization
of Congress, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1946).
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private claim bills. When enacted, it contained a prohibition
of such claim bills and a broad waiver of sovereign immunity
known as the Federal Tort Claims Act.1 3
Federal Tort Claims Act
The Act embodies the consent of the United States to be
sued for the tortious acts of its agents. Although expansive, the
Act provides certain exceptions to this general consent.'4 The
exception applicable to the Postal Service reads as follows:
"The provisions of this title [Federal Tort Claims Act] shall
not apply to . . .(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscar-
riage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter."' 5
The legislative history accompanying the committee's bill gave
few clues to the congressional intent underlying this exception.
It simply noted that Senate Bill 2177 was designed "to provide
for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the Govern-
ment."'" Its pervasive language, standing alone, arguably could
extend to postal employees who were previously held liable for
their negligent acts. If this interpretation were adopted, the
Federal Tort Claims Act would erect a substantial barrier to
recovery for those victimized by defective mail service.
However, several factors militate against the adoption of
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1970).
14. Id. § 2680(a)-(c) (1970). This section provides in pertinent part:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall not
apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regula-
tion, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmis-
sion of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any
tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any
officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.
15. Id. § 2680(b).
16. 92 CONG. REC. index, at 579 (1946). In the index to the Hearings before
the Special Committee on the Organization of Congress, there was only one listing
relevant to the matter at hand-"Private Claim Bills." The testimony made no
mention of the "postal matter" exception. The gist of the testimony was that con-
gressional consideration of private claim bills exhausted too much time and was
not the optimal means of disposition of claims in the interest of justice. Additionally,
Senate Report 1400 of the Special Committee on the Organization of Congress cast no
light on the exception under consideration other than the points elucidated in notes
9-13 and accompanying text supra.
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this interpretation. First, it is readily inferable from the discus-
sions of the Senate and House centering around earlier legisla-
tion, that the exception was intended to apply to actions
against the federal government only, not individual postal offi-
cials."
Second, though there are no reported decisions attempting
to apply the Postal Service's exception to shield individual
employees from liability, cases interpreting the other excep-
tions in the Act present a rational argument that they apply
only to suits against the United States and do not afford im-
munity to its employees engaged in the function described.'8
Thus, in Henderson v. Bluemink,'5 the court reasoned:
Generally, suits involving damages caused by an employee
of the United States are brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act which provides a basis for recovery against the
United States. However, with the exception of a provision
in the Act and others found elsewhere, there is no statutory
protection for federal employees from personal liability ar-
ising out of their own negligent conduct while acting within
the scope of their employment. The Act itself provides that
17. A number of bills waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States were
introduced in Congress prior to the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Al-
though none of these bills became law, they are useful in determining congressional
intent in regard to the "postal matter" exception which all of them contained. For
example, the hearings on S. 2690 contain part of the memorandum for the Attorney
General in which it is stated that the Federal Tort Claims Act excepts from its scope,
"a series of torts as to which, for the time being at least, it may be dangerous for the
Government to subject itself to suit, until in any event considerable experience has
been had under the proposed legislation." Hearings on S. 2690 Before the Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1940). The Chairman
of the Federal Bar Association criticized the exemptions from suit. Id. at 14. Addition-
ally, Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, stated that the
bill "merely waives the immunity of the United States against being sued." Id. at 34
(emphasis added). At the hearings on H.R. 7236, Holtzoff, who played a significant
role in drafting the proposed legislation, further explained:
Now, section 303 exempts from the scope of the measure certain types of
torts (such as those involving loss of letters or postal matter). The theory
of these exemptions is that, since this bill is a radical innovation, perhaps
we had better take it step by step and exempt certain torts and certain
actions which might give rise to tort claims that would be difficult to
defend or in respect to which it would be unjust to make the Government
liable.
Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 22 (1940) (emphasis added). The thrust of the debates
on H.R. 7236 was that the Federal Tort Claims Act and its exceptions concern the
government, not the individual postal officials. See 86 CONG. REC. 12015-32 (1940).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(c) (1970).
19. 511 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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a judgment against the United States shall operate as a
bar to any action against the individual employee, but that
section proscribes a double recovery, not a suit against the
individual employee in the first instance."
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the Federal Tort
Claims Act should not bar an unhappy postal customer from
suing individual postal employees for negligent delivery of serv-
ices. Both the case law interpreting the Act and the legislative
history accompanying it, seem to contemplate this type of suit.
However, after overcoming this initial barrier to recovery, a
second potential obstacle must be considered-the effect of the
Postal Reorganization Act of 1971.
THE POSTAL REORGANIZATION ACT
Legislative Background
In 1971, Congress completely revamped the Post Office
Department by passing the Postal Reorganization Act."2 The
Department was given a new name, the Postal Service," and
was abolished as a cabinet level department.23 The new Postal
Service is directed by an eleven member board of governors,
nine of which are chosen by the President. 4 Under chapter four
of Title 39, the Service is given broad powers, such as acquiring
property,25 settling claims, constructing facilities," entering
contracts, 8 and accepting gifts in its own name.2" Of special
significance is the provision allowing the Postal Service "to sue
and be sued in its official name."30
The House report accompanying the Postal Reorganiza-
20. Id. at 403-04. Similarly, in Turner v. Ralston, 409 F. Supp. 1260 (W.D. Wis.
1976), the court reasoned: "An injured person in a non-automobile case may at his
option sue the federal official responsible for the injury instead of or in addition to the
government. In fact, a judgment against the individual officers does not preclude a
later action against the United States .. Id. at 1261 (citations omitted).
21. 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605 (1970).
22. Id. § 201.
23. Section 201 provides: "There is established, as an independent establishment
of the executive branch of the Government of the United States, the United States
Postal Service." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 401(3).
29. Id. § 401(7).
30. Id. § 401(1).
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tion Act labels the Postal Service as a "public service."'"
Though ostensibly cast in the public mold, it would be more
accurate to term the Postal Service a public-private hybrid.
For example, the Service is accorded the power to incur obliga-
tions up to a ten billion dollar ceiling in its own name.32 Simi-
larly, the discussion which attended the passage of the reorgan-
ization bill emphasized the need to infuse elements of private
enterprise into the Service. Additionally, the bill reflects an
attempt by Congress to minimize political control over the
postal system, by turning it loose from the political patronage
system .
Given this public-private hybrid, the question then be-
comes what effect does its creation have on the individual's
ability to sue the Postal Service or its employees? Alterna-
tively, assuming the ability to sue survives, does the exception
provided in the Federal Tort Claims Act have any continued
validity with respect to the new Service? A partial answer to
these inquiries is supplied by cases interpreting the "sue or be
sued" language of the Reorganization Act.
Postal Cases Defining the "Sue and Be Sued" Language
Granted the ability to "sue and be sued in its official
name," the Postal Service has been subjected to liability in
cases occurring subsequent to the reorganization of 1971. For
example, Association of American Publishers v. Governors of
the United States Postal Service involved a postal rate dispute
growing out of a decision of the Governors of the Postal Service
which effectively increased postal rates.34 The court noted that
the Postal Service, as a suable entity, was accountable for its
legal errors.35 The court went on to define a basis for a private
action against a postal governor: "Of course, this does not
mean that if personally, or in some official capacity other than
as a signatory to an order of the Postal Service, a Governor
31. H.R. REP. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in [19701 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3660.
32. 39 U.S.C. § 2005 (1970).
33. H.R. REP. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970), reprinted in [19701 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3652. Congress was concerned over the political cronyism
prevailing in the Post Office. By giving the Postal Service the ability to incur obliga-
tions and enter into contracts without political approval, Congress hoped that the
Service would become a more business-like operation, untainted by political patron-
age.
34. 485 F.2d (2d Cir. 1973).
35. Id. at 772.
1978]
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erroneously, negligently, or willfully injured some person, the
Governor might not properly be named in some proceeding a
defendant."3 American Publishers is important in two re-
spects. First, it made clear that the Reorganization Act did not
dampen the individual's right to sue the Postal Service for its
negligence. Second, it indicated that Postal Service employees
would remain liable individually for their negligence in a pro-
per factual setting. However, American Publishers did not es-
tablish whether "a proper factual setting" encompassed the
negligent handling of the mail.
In addition, later cases have suggested that the "sue and
be sued" language of the Reorganization Act may actually ex-
pand those situations in which the Postal Service could be
liable. Thus, in White v. Bloomberg, a postal employee
claimed back pay and post-judgment interest in a labor dis-
pute. 7 The Postal Service contended that as a governmental
agency it was immune from an award of post-judgment inter-
est. In rejecting this claim, the court acknowledged that under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity the government could not,
without its consent, be obligated to pay interest on its debts.
However, the court noted that it was equally well established
that sovereign immunity was waived when Congress authorized
an agency to sue or be sued in its own name.38 Similarly, in
Kennedy Electric Co. v. United States Postal Service, a sub-
contractor claimed that the Postal Service negligently failed to
obtain payment and performance bonds from a contractor.39 In
granting relief, the court broadly construed the "sue and be
sued language" relying on F.H.A. v. Burr:'
[Aibsent implied exceptions and restrictions, not here
present, or other showing that Congress used the phrase in
a narrow sense, it must be presumed that when Congress
launched a governmental agency into the commercial
world and endowed it with the authority to "sue or be
sued," that agency is not less amenable to judicial process
than a private enterprise under like circumstances would
be.41
The application of the F.H.A. logic to the Postal Service
36. Id.
37. 501 F.2d 1379 (2d Cir. 1974).
38. Id. at 1385.
39. 508 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1974).
40. 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940).
41. 508 F.2d at 957.
248 [Vol. 18
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by the Kennedy court represented an important breakthrough.
The Kennedy court, in drawing an analogy between the "sue
and be sued" wording of the Banking Act of 1935 and the
language in the Postal Reorganization Act, impliedly left the
Service open to a broad spectrum of tort claims. This would
indeed be the case if the Service is considered subject to all
those suits available against private business. In addition,
Kennedy can be read to imply that for purposes of the "sue or
be sued" language the Postal Service is to be treated similar
to other federal alphabet agencies. A substantial body of well-
developed case law has grown up around the "sued or be sued"
language as applied to these other agencies. A careful analysis
of the judicial treatment of these analogous agencies will serve
to define those types of situations which will fasten liability on
the agency or its employees.
Analogous Cases Defining the "Sue and Be Sued" Language
As noted previously, the court in F.H.A. stated that the
"sue and be sued" language opened the federal agency to law-
suits on the same level as private enterprise.2 This status has
led to these agencies being liable in tort. For example, in Keifer
& Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp. & Regional Agricul-
tural Credit Corp., the plaintiff sued the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation and its chartered subsidiary for negligence
in failing to provide proper care for cattle delivered under a
cattle feeding contract.43 In finding liability, the Supreme
Court negated the concept of sovereign immunity as applied to
government corporations:
In spawning these corporations during the past two de-
cades, Congress has uniformly included amenability to
law..Congress has provided for not less than forty of such
corporations discharging governmental functions, and
without exception the authority to sue-and-be-sued was
included. Such a firm practice is partly an indication of
the present climate of opinion which has brought govern-
mental immunity from suit into disfavor, partly it reveals
a definite attitude on the part of Congress which should be
given hospitable scope."
In addition, the Court maintained that the liability of a gov-
42. 309 U.S. at 245.
43. 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
44. Id. at 390-91.
19781
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ernment corporation empowered generally "to sue and be
sued" was not confined to suits sounding only in contract. The
Court found no sound policy reasons for making a government
corporation's liability contingent upon the substantive nature
of the claim presented.45
As Keifer & Keifer reveals, courts have been willing to
pierce government agencies which are ostensibly semi-private
corporations functioning under government auspices. This will-
ingness apparently stems from courts' inability to find policy
reasons which serve to limit the individual's right to recover
against agencies existing free from substantial government
control. 6 The Postal Reorganization Act, by its terms, endeav-
ors to set the Postal Service apart from governmental control.47
Therefore, it seems arguable that the Postal Service should be
liable for the torts of its employees. Nevertheless, the courts
have not yet arrived at this conclusion.48
The conclusion reached in the preceding analysis must be
reconciled with the express immunity which was afforded the
Post Office under the Federal Tort Claims Act. A possible rec-
45. Id. at 396. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S.
81 (1941) (no presumption that an agent of the federal government is immune from
suit). See also Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229 (1934); Sloan
Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549
(1921); Prato v. Homeowners' Loan Corp., 106 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1939); Pennell v.
Homeowners' Loan Corp., 21 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Me. 1937).
46. Courts have recognized that governmental agencies might potentially be
liable even when created by executive order and not by congressional mandate (such
as the Postal Service). See Herren v. Farm Security Administration, 153 F.2d 76 (8th
Cir. 1946) (contract damages available against agency created by executive order);
Thomason v. Work Projects Administration, 138 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1943) (congres-
sional agencies established with "sue and be sued language" are liable even in tort).
47. See notes 21-34 and accompanying text supra.
48. See, e.g., Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252
(2d Cir. 1975). In Myers a former "star route" carrier sued two individual postal
employees, the Postal Service and the United States for negligence in terminating
contracts on false information. The court dismissed the action as to all defendants
except the United States, stating:
We should first note that suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act lies
here, if at all, only against the United States. Neither the Postal Service
nor the Postal Inspection Service, named as defendants, may be sued
directly on claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
The district court also lacks jurisdiction in respect to the two individ-
ual Postal Service employees named as defendants in this action. Only
claims against the United States are included within the Federal Tort
Claims Act jurisdiction. . . . No justification for ancillary or diversity
jurisdiction has been claimed or argued for by appellants in this case.
Id. at 1256.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the court characterized the decision not to
renew the star route contracts as discretionary in nature. Id. at 1258.
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onciliation is to ignore the grant of immunity, since the "sue
and besued" language in the Reorganization Act can be read
to have impliedly repealed it. The force of this reconciliation,
however, is considerably weakened by the holding of the Su-
preme Court in Posadas v. National City Bank.4" In this case
the Court announced a "cardinal rule" that repeals by implica-
tion are not favored."' The Court confined repeals by implica-
tion to two well-settled categories. The first arises when the
provisions of the two competing acts are in irreconcilable con-
flict. In this situation, the later act impliedly repeals the earlier
one to the extent of the conflict.' The second arises if the later
act covered the entire subject of the earlier one and was
"clearly intended as a substitute." 2 In this situation, the later
act repeals the original one in its entirety. 3
The former approach probably will not sustain the conten-
tion that the grant of immunity can be ignored. Since the
Postal Reorganization Act did not repeal the Federal Tort
Claims Act, but simply authorized the Post Office to incur new
responsibilities, it could be maintained that no "irreconcilable
conflict" exists between the two acts. 4 The latter approach
probably would not support ignoring the grant of immunity
either, since it cannot be adequately established that the
Postal Reorganization Act was intended to supplant the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act.
As a result of the courts' reluctance to favor repeal by
implication, the Postal Reorganization Act may not have af-
fected the Postal Service's grant of immunity under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. Under this view, the Service itself contin-
ues to remain immune from attacks based on negligent han-
dling of transmission of the mail. In spite of the Service's con-
tinued immunity, the Reorganization Act probably did not af-
49. 296 U.S. 497 (1936).
50. Id. at 503.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. See United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88 (1871). In Tynen,
Justice Field maintained that if two acts
are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act, without any re-
pealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the
first; and even where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if
the latter act covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new
provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the
first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act.
Id. at 92.
54. See 296 U.S. at 503.
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fect the availability of an action against a supervisor who negli-
gently discharges his duties. However, it still must be shown
that this negligent discharge of duty was the cause of the actual
injury in question. Even if this can be shown, the claimant may
still face a barrier to recovery-the doctrine of discretionary
immunity.
DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY
Liability-Producing Decisions
In discharging the duties of his office, a postal official
makes many types of decisions and performs many different
functions. The making of any particular decision or the per-
formance or nonperformance of any identifiable function could
conceivably produce a chain of causation that eventually in-jures a postal customer. Though liability could flow from all
such acts or omissions, Congress, in passing the Tort Claims
Act, expressly provided that certain types of decisions would
not be liability producing. Specifically, Congress mandated
that liability would not flow from a government official's
"exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty . . . whether or not the discre-
tion involved be abused."5 This exemption from liability also
extended to the federal agency that employed the decision-
maker.5" Thus, the Act makes a distinction between decisions
which can produce liability and those cloaked with immunity
from suit.
This distinction was first enunciated in Barr v. Matteo.57
In Barr, the petitioner was sued for libel over material con-
tained in his press release. As a defense, he argued that the
material was absolutely privileged. The Supreme Court, per
Justice Harlan, sustained the defense on the grounds that the
publication of a press release was a discretionary function and
hence, not actionable." Barr established a basic rule that, in
order to foster fearless leadership and courageous decisionmak-
ing unencumbered by second thoughts of possible liability, the
discretionary acts of executive officials of the government do
not give rise to liability.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970).
56. Id.
57. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
58. Id. at 574.
[Vol. 18
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After Barr, the question remains whether or not a postal
official's supervision of the day to day handling of the mail is
to be accorded discretionary status. If not, his failure to pro-
perly discharge this duty would open the door to liability.
Though, this question has yet to be resolved, a line of cases
exists imposing liability on supervisory personnel in other areas
of government. It seems reasonable to assume that if negligent
supervision is actionable with regard to one government
agency, it should be equally actionable with regard to another
agency similarly situated. An examination of this line of cases
will aid in the determination of their applicability in the con-
text of postal supervision.
Supervisorial Liability in Government Agencies
There is no black letter formula for determining whether
or not a particular supervisorial activity will be accorded dis-
cretionary status. In Estrada v. Hills, the court attempted to
outline the distinction between discretionary and nondiscre-
tionary decisions." Estrada involved a suit by the owner of a
building which burned down when a neighboring building,
owned by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), caught fire. The complaint charged that the fire was
caused by the negligence of the Secretary of HUD and various
other officials of the Department. In determining the potential
liability of the various officials, the Estrada court enunciated
the following test: "Generally speaking, a duty is discretionary
if it involves judgment, planning or policy decisions. It is not
discretionary if it involves enforcement or administration of a
mandatory duty at the operational level, even if some degree
of expert evaluation is required.""0 The Estrada opinion is note-
worthy for the manner in which this test was applied to the two
individuals directly charged with supervising the maintenance
of the building. The court maintained that the mere supervi-
sion of employees was not a discretionary activity."
In Seaboard Coastline Railroad v. United States, another
court attempted to flesh out the discretionary-nondiscretionary
59. 401 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. II. 1975).
60. Id. at 436.
61. Id. at 437. The court noted: "The affidavits submitted by defendants Miller
and Ice suggest that their duties are not discretionary. They are charged with supervis-
ing the disposition of HUD property, but they do not claim that they set policy or
engage in planning. Apparently their duties are operational and they execute policies
determined by others." Id.
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distinction.2 In this case, the railroad sued the federal govern-
ment and a government official for injury to its railroad cars
and an employee when its tracks were washed away by water
diverted from a federal aircraft maintenance facility. In finding
the government liable, the court provided additional clarifica-
tion on discretionary and nondiscretionary activity:
The discretionary function envisioned by 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a) . . . was the government's policy decision to con-
struct an aircraft maintenance facility at Fort Rucker and
to build a drainage system in furtherance of that goal.
Once the government decided to build a drainage ditch, it
was no longer exercising a discretionary policy-making
function and it was required to perform the operational
function of building the drainage ditch in a non-negligent
manner.
63
The line of demarcation between discretionary and nondis-
cretionary decisionmaking is further sharpened by a look at two
additional cases." In the first, Stanley v. United States, the
plaintiff's estate sued for damages in conjunction with the
death of a workman killed while painting a radio tower owned
by the government. 5 The complaint charged that the govern-
ment negligently caused the death by failing to construct a
safety rail around the tower which would have prevented the
accident. The government again argued that the executive de-
cision to build such a railing was discretionary and thus,
cloaked in the mantle of immunity. In allowing recovery, the
court noted that once the decision had been made to construct
the tower, there were no competing policy considerations in-
62. 473 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
63. Id. at 716.
64. See also Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). Though
decided before Barr v. Matteo, this case applied a discretionary/ministerial analysis.
Plaintiff sued the United States for negligent failure to keep a lighthouse beacon lit,
resulting in damage to a ship. The court parried the government's assertion that
maintenance of the lighthouse involved discretion:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it
exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chadeleur Island and engen-
dered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to
use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working
order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then the Coast Guard
was further obligated to use due care to discover this fact and to repair
the light to give warning that it was not functioning. If the Coast Guard
failed in its duty and damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the
United States is liable under the Tort Claims Act.
Id. at 69.
65. 347 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Me. 1972).
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volved in how to do it. Consequently, the failure to provide a
safety rail was not the result of a discretionary decision but a
mere operational decision from which liability could arise. 8
The second, Henderson v. Bluemink, involved an army
doctor who was sued for malpractice. 7 In his defense, the doc-
tor contended that his job entailed a panoply of discretionary
functions which should immunize his decisions from liability.
The court disagreed, stating that the civil standards for mal-
practice liability should apply. The court saw no reason to
insulate the army doctor from liability in the interest of pre-
serving fearless, vigorous and effective administration of the
policies of the government. 8
The preceding cases provide a strong conceptual founda-
tion for the premise that a postal official who fails to properly
perform his duty of supervision is liable for the damage proxi-
mately caused to a customer by his negligence. Taken together
they establish the principle that although it may have been a
nurse who gave the fatal injection,69 a janitor who allowed rub-
bish to accumulate and a fire hazard to develop,70 or a construc-
tion worker who improperly dug a drainage ditch,7 this does
not automatically relieve the employee's supervisor of liabil-
ity.72 Thus, a postal worker's mishandling of the mail should
66. Id. at 1095-96.
67. 511 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
For a malpractice action against employees of an army hospital, see Costley v.
United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950). Plaintiff, a military dependent treated in
an army hospital, sued for malpractice in the care given her during delivery of her
child. The United States responded with the argument that surely the daily activi-
ties of a doctor in caring for patients and saving lives was discretionary. Rejecting this
argument, the court said:
In order to determine whether or not the government comes within the
exemption set out above, we must decide whether or not it was exercising
a discretionary function or duty when its employees negligently injected
a harmful substance into Mrs. Costley's body. We think they were not
exercising a discretionary function, because they had already exercised
their discretion by admitting her into the hospital, and once having ad-
mitted her and undertaken the delivery of her child, they were under a
duty to attend and treat her.
Id. at 724.
68. Recall that Barr v. Matteo employed this language 15 years earlier. See 360
U.S. at 571. The Henderson court used the same language, but came to a different
conclusion. See 511 F.2d at 403-04.
69. See Henderson v. Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
70. See Estrada v. Hills, 401 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
71. See Seaboard Coastline R.R. v. United States, 473 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
72. See Dunlop v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 242 (1812); Wright v. McCann,
460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972); Moon v. Winfield, 368 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Raisler
v. Oliver, 97 Ala. 710, 12 So. 238 (1893); Perkins v. Blauth, 163 Cal. 782, 122 P. 50
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not provide a threshold barrier that insulates his negligent su-
pervisor from liability.
Additionally, these cases make clear that an examination
of the competing policy factors, which go into the making of the
particular decision or the performance of any particular activ-
ity, is the crux of the discretionary-nondiscretionary distinc-
tion. When this examination is directed at the unique aspects
of post office supervision, it can readily be seen that there are
nondiscretionary activities involved in managing the handling
of the mail.
A postmaster is entrusted with the duty of supervising the
daily receipt, processing and delivery of the mail. If a problem
arises in the processing of the mail at his facility, the postmas-
ter is charged with implementing procedures to remedy it. A
postmaster does not personally handle the mail, yet he must
see that his subordinates handle it properly.
Following the logic of the earlier cases, it would appear
that the selection of the proper procedure to handle the mail
involves competing policy considerations and thus, is discre-
tionary. However, once the selected procedure has been imple-
mented it would similarly appear that the supervision of han-
dling based on that procedure could be construed as opera-
tional and thus, nondiscretionary.11 A failure to properly per-
form this latter function could generate liability.
To date, the courts have not yet ruled on what facets of a
postmaster's job call for discretionary, policy-making deci-
sions. In formulating the discretionary-nondiscretionary dis-
tinction with respect to the tasks of postal supervision, the
courts might be influenced by several factors. One potential
factor is the scope of the postmaster's job. Considering the
immense amount of mail which passes through a postal facility
daily, courts might view the supervisor's job as a series of on
the spot procedural decisions that should be accorded discre-
tionary status. This volume of mail also gives rise to another
potential factor. In view of the many handling problems the
amount of mail creates, courts might take the position that a
supervisor is not physically able to supervise every facet of mail
service. Thus, it would not be realistic to impose liability on
(1912); Proper v. Sutter Drainage Dist., 53 Cal. App. 576, 200 P. 664 (1921). See also
Failowski v. Schapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Olvstead v. Dolphin, 152 Wash.
604, 278 P.681 (1929).
73. See notes 59-68 and accompanying text supra.
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him for failure to properly supervise all the procedures de-
signed to run the modern postal facility.
A final factor which may influence the court's formulation
is the recent legislative proposal to hold the Postal Service
accountable for various negligent acts of its agents. This at-
tempt may cause the courts to view supervisorial liability more
favorably-as simply in line with emerging congressional pol-
icy. As a result, this trend merits attention.
Postal Service Accountability
Congress has recently attempted to deal with the problem
of Postal Service accountability for the negligence of its agents.
A bill has been introduced in the United States House of Rep-
resentatives by Norman Mineta (D-Cal.) which would afford
injured customers of the Postal Service a measure of relief.74
74. H.R. 14465, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The bill was introduced on June 18,
1976.
Mr. Mineta's remarks to Congress upon his introduction of H.R. 14465 are a
succinct statement of the problem faced by the mail customer:
Today I have introduced legislation which, if enacted, will for the
first time set forth specific Congressional standards to govern the carriage
of mail by the Postal Service, and will provide individuals and businesses
with a legal remedy for damages incurred through the negligence of the
Postal Service. In my brief experience as a Member of the Postal Service
Subcommittee, I have come to realize that the Postal Service is a lot like
a stubborn donkey-you can try to entice it into acceptable and desired
behavior by dangling financial carrots in front of it, but you should al-
ways have a pretty good stick to coax it along from behind occasionally.
My bill provides that stick, in a manner most in keeping with practical-
ity. While this body has been debating various policy aspects of the postal
system, we have been ignoring what perhaps is the fundamental com-
plaint against the U.S. Postal Service-its abysmal performance in the
carriage of the mails. While we try and halt the closings of small post
offices in rural areas, the extension of clusterbox and curbside delivery
in suburban areas and the curtailment of necessary business service in
urban areas, we ignore the fact that there are many Americans who find
themselves losing money in their dealings with the Postal Service-
money which is lost due to the failure of the Postal Service to adequately
perform its basic function of moving the mail with due speed, care and
accuracy.
Millions of individuals and businesses rely on the mails for economic
livelihood. When the Postal Service loses, delays or damages their mail,
it often results in monetary losses which cannot be recovered, but must
be paid out of their own pockets. These losses mean more to those af-
fected than any debate on who should make postal policy, or on who
should pay how much in postage.
What recourse has an individual or business whose parcels are dam-
aged or lost due to the negligence of the Postal Service? None. What
recourse has an individual or business when an important check, contract
or bid is lost or delivered weeks late? None. Despite the fact that the
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The bill seeks to amend Title 39 of the United States Code to
provide that the Postal Service shall be liable for negligent
handling or delivery of mail.75 Additionally, the bill proposes a
one hundred dollar limit on Service liability for lost mail if two
alternative rates of postage are established, and the customer
elects to pay the lower rate."6 To clear up any potential conflict
with the Federal Tort Claims Act, the legislation specifically
strikes the section granting the Service immunity." Finally,
the bill provides substantial assistance to the customer seeking
relief. If the mail is damaged, lost, or delayed, it is presumed
that this is due to the negligence of the Service and the pre-
sumption can be rebutted only by a clear preponderance of the
evidence."
Unfortunately, the bill represents only a small step towardproviding for a truly accountable Postal Service in the business
sphere. The average business customer simply cannot afford to
pay the higher postage rates, set out by the bill, for his bulk
mailings. Yet if he does not, he may collect only one hundred
Postal Service has caused financial losses and/or damage to business
reputations and credit ratings, under the present law it is immune from
suit arising in this manner.
We in the Congress have acted, in the passage of HR 8603, to strip
the postal management of its shield against Congressional and Adminis-
trative controls, by abolishing the Board of Governors, returning the
Postmaster General to the Cabinet, and taking back budgetary controls
over the USPS's finances. It is time we acted to strip the Postal Service
of its shield of "sovereign immunity," which is used to protect it from the
results of its negligence.
By prescribing specific standards governing the manner in which the
U.S. mails are to be treated, and by making a violation of those standards
evidence of negligence on the part of the Postal Service, we can give the
American people a good, sound stick to prod the Postal Service into
upgrading the service they provide. By allowing these suits to be pursued,
we make ourselves clear on the fact that we will no longer tolerate sloppy
service and arrogant, "consumer-be-damned" attitudes from those who
are to serve the American public.
Letter from Congressman Norman Mineta's Office to Robert Froelich (September,
1976) [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
75. See H.R. 14465, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3686 (a)(1), (1976).
76. Id. § 3686(a)(2)(B). A different system of recovery is proposed for delayed
mail: "(ii) the amount of postage paid multiplied by 10, in the case of delayed mail."
Id. § 3686(a)(2)(A).
77. Id. § 3686 § 2.
78. Id. § 3686(b) provides:
In any action against the Postal Service for the recovery of damages under
this section, the damaged mail, delayed mail, or lost mail involved shall
be presumed to have been damaged, delayed, or lost as a result of the
negligence of the Postal Service, or the officers, employees, or agents of
the Postal Service. Such presumption may be rebutted only by a clear
preponderance of the evidence.
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dollars for lost mail or ten times his postage for delayed mail.79
Though it is a positive step, the bill does not allow for recovery
of many types of damages, such as loss of business reputation,
which are likely to be suffered if the mail is negligently han-
dled.
In light of the proposed legislative limits on Postal Service
liability and its current legislative immunity, the injured cus-
tomer's best avenue to complete relief appears to be a suit
against the postmaster-supervisor. Supervisorial liability argu-
ably survives both the immunity provisions of the Federal Tort
Claims Act and the legislative restructuring of the Postal Re-
organization Act. Similarly, it can be contended that there are
aspects of postal supervision which require nondiscretionary
decisionmaking and activity. Thus, the suit against the
postmaster-supervisor should survive the doctrine of discre-
tionary immunity. In spite of the plausability of this analysis,
it has not yet been adopted by the courts.
CONCLUSION
The ability of postal officials to hide behind the cloak of
sovereign immunity is repugnant to the democratic principle of
individual accountability for one's acts and to the legal concept
that "for every wrong there is a remedy." Chief Justice Traynor
of the California Supreme Court noted this in his landmark
opinion in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District:
The rule of governmental immunity for tort is an anach-
ronism, without rational basis and has existed only by
force of inertia. It has been judicially abolished in other
jurisdictions. None of the reasons for its continuance can
withstand analysis. No one defends total governmental
immunity. In fact it does not exist. It has become riddled
with exceptions, both legislative and judicial, and the ex-
ceptions operate so illogically as to cause serious inequal-
ity. o
79. See notes 99-100 and accompanying text supra.
80. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1961).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity appears to have originated by accident in
Russell v. The Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788), where plaintiff,
who could name no entity responsible for his injury, sued "The Men of Devon" not as
a municipal corporation, but as a group of unnamed defendants. Rather than dismiss
the case for failure to name a defendant, the English Court stated a principle which
was subsequently adopted in the United States. This flawed legal concept was later
rejected by English courts but paradoxically flourished in this country during the
nineteenth century. See Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So. 2d 68 (1975).
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Furthermore, a supervisory postal official should not be
absolved of liability for his own negligence merely because he
has attained a supervisory position."1 On the other hand, postal
officials cannot be made insurers of the safe and timely arrival
of every piece of mail which passes through their post office.
Therefore, a balance must be struck between these two ex-
tremes. One solution would be to accord a postal official one
mistake per customer. This "free ride" approach would engen-
der the type of personal accountability necessary. Subsequent
errors could be punished by personal liability in tort. A supervi-
sory postal official would be more apt to actually "supervise"
his employees if he knew that failure to remedy errors by his
subordinates would result in personal accountability.
Under this solution, a ceiling on personal liability wouldhave to be set, in order to avoid multimillion dollar judgments
being rendered against an individual employee. To facilitate an
adequate recovery to injured plaintiff, a subordination provi-
sion could be enacted providing that the United States would
The United States Supreme Court as early as 1939 recognized the disfavored
status of sovereign immunity in Kiefer & Kiefer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. (RFC),306 U.S. 381 (1939). In discussing the RFC's argument that the Court of Claims had
no jurisdiction because the case sounded in tort rather than in contract, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter refused to "make application of a steadily growing policy of governmental
liability contingent upon irrelevant procedural factors. These, in our law, are still
deeply rooted in historical accidents to which the expanding conception of public
morality regarding governmental responsibility should not be subordinated. "Id. at 396(emphasis added). This same language is cited with approval in Petty v. Tennessee-
Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 280 (1959).
81. A traditional function of civil liability for negligence is to supply a
sanction which encourages care appropriate to the needs of society and
the circumstances of the case. Therefore, where governmental immunity
has had the effect of encouraging laxness and a disregard of potential
harm, exposure of the government to liability for its torts will have the
effect of increasing governmental care and concern for the welfare of those
who might be injured by its actions. This increased concern would cause
government officials to evaluate proposed activities in light of their total
costs, both those paid directly and those paid indirectly in the form of
compensation for injuries to the individual members of society. Otherwise
stated, government liability forces the official to balance the total social
utility of the action undertaken against the total risks and cost to society.
The government will thus be encouraged to take the course which is
ultimately the most economical to society.
Note, The Discretionary Exception and Municipal Tort Liability: A Reappraisal, 52
MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1056-57 (1968) (citations omitted).
For an enlightening article as to abolition of tort immunity of state entities, seeLambert, Tort Law, 36 AM. TRIAL LAW. J. 20 (1976). Lambert maintains: "Official
maladministration is tyranny and legalized pillage unless redressed by an adequate set
of remedies against the blameworthy governmental unit, its officals and its agencies."
Id. at 34.
1978] LOST OR MISHANDLED MAIL 261
pay all judgment sums in excess of the mandated personal
liability ceiling. 2 Though the taxpayer would consequently be
burdened to some extent, on balance, it appears more just to
distribute the effects of Postal Service negligence over a broad
segment of the populace rather than severely damaging an in-
dividual customer or small businessman. Such a rule would be
in keeping with both the spirit and the letter of the law.
Robert A. Froehlich
82. A correlative solution would be to retain individual immunity of postal offi-
cials from tort, with the proviso that after one negligence judgment against an individ-
ual postal employee (which the United States would pay in its entirety), the official
would automatically be discharged upon committing a second error.

